Let’s Get Tough!

Let’s Get Tough! is a 1942 film and the ninth film in the East Side Kids series, starring Leo Gorcey (as Muggs), Huntz Hall (as Glimpy), Bobby Jordan (as Danny), and Robert Armstrong (as “Pops” the Cop). Released in early 1942, it was directed by Wallace Fox, and features the gang caught up in World War II and fighting the Black Dragon Society, an enemy sabotage ring.

Watching a military parade (stock footage from World War I), the gang decides to enlist in order to “kill a million Japs”. Rejected by the Army, Marines, and Navy for being too young, the punks help the war effort by throwing fruit at a shop they believe is owned by a Japanese American. Confronted by him wielding a short sword how to tenderize round steak without a mallet, the gang decides to come back at night but find him dead. Their father figure Police Lieutenant “Pops” Stevens tell them they should be ashamed of themselves as Keno best fabric for sweaters, the owner of the shop, was Chinese, an ally of America and that Danny should be especially ashamed as his brother is in the service.

The boys buy some flowers and go to the shop to apologize to the widow and notice a Japanese man take a pen from a locker the widow opened for him. Glimpy steals the pen and find that it contains a message written in Japanese.

They visit a Japanese shop run by Mr. Matsui to have it translated glass bottle design. He tries to steal the message but the gang threatens him, whereupon Mr. Matsui commits hara-kiri in their presence. The boys run to the police.

Matusui’s son (Philip Ahn) successfully disguises himself as his late father to impersonate him and discredit the boys to the police. The boys take the law in their own hands to discover that Matsui is in league with German residents of the neighborhood (such as Gabriel Dell, who would play a different role in each film of the series) who are in a sabotage group called the Black Dragon Society. In a subplot, Danny’s brother Phil (Tom Brown) has supposedly been dishonourably discharged from the US Navy but is working undercover to infiltrate the Black Dragons. Danny’s brother’s girlfriend Nora (Florence Rice), (who is in the WAVES) has a Japanese friend she went to high school with whom she seeks help from to translate the message. However he turns out to be Matsui’s son, the leader of the spy ring and has her locked up in a cell in the basement of the shop.

The gang breaks into Matsui’s shop that is filled with haunted house type secret passageways and trapdoors where they discover the Black Dragon Society dressed in hooded costumes that Glimpy refers to as “Japanese Halloween”. The gang frees Nora and revenges the attack on Pearl Harbor by beating up the saboteurs. The film ends with Nora and Phil getting married but as they walk down the church steps with a sabre arch of East Side Kids holding their captured Japanese swords (that are quickly confiscated by the police at the end of the ceremony!). Phil is told he has orders to report back to his base as soon as possible. Phil and Nora briefly lament their not going on a honeymoon, but Muggs and the gang pile in the car and gallantly offer to accompany Nora on her honeymoon unaware of what a honeymoon entails.

Made between Mr Wise Guy and Smart Alecks, the East Side Kids go from being a gang of punks to a group of, as Danny puts it, “Junior G-Men” (an in joke as that was the name of two serials the gang did for Universal Pictures). The film captures the attitudes many Americans felt towards Japanese but this is tempered with the boys being chastised and shamed for attacking an innocent shopkeeper. Japanese American internment on the West Coast of America did not begin until Civilian Exclusion Order No. 346 was issued on May 3, 1942 authorized by Executive Order 9066. The Black Dragon Society was an actual Japanese espionage organization that first appeared in the Russo-Japanese War. On March 27, 1942 FBI agents arrested members of the Black Dragon Society in the San Joaquin Valley of California.

The Black Dragon society also appeared in Black Dragons a 1942 release starring Bela Lugosi also written by Harvey Gates and filmed by Sam Katzman’s production company.

Ernest Morrison who played Scuno in the film said that in a scene where the gang runs off he thought the filming had stopped and began counting his money he had in his pocket. The gang ad-libbed an attack on him.

The British Board of Film Censors who usually gave the East Side Kids series an ‘A’ (adult) rating gave Let’s Get Tough! a rating approving it for all audiences, perhaps as a wartime morale booster.

At just over an hour, Let’s Get Tough! is fast-paced with the romantic subplot and comedy setpieces blending into the main plot of the sabotage ring. For example, Glimpy’s incompetent violin playing grating on his teacher’s nerves lead to the gang pawning the violin to buy flowers for Mr Keno’s widow, that leads them to see Matsui’s son take the pen that contains the secret message. The same violin case attracts Glimpy’s attention to discover that it now contains magnesium powder (that Glimpy steals a sample of) to be used for sabotage that the gang only discover when it explodes and burns when placed next to Glimpy’s mother’s stove. The film stands as a reminder of the attitudes and cultures of the time, such as a fear of sabotage from well known members of the community.

Charles Grando

Charles Grando, ou Carles Grandó, né à Perpignan (Pyrénées-Orientales) le et mort le dans cette même ville, est un écrivain, poète, philologue et dramaturge autodidacte français d’expression catalane et française. Très actif dans la Renaissance catalane littéraire, il est un des membres fondateurs de l’Académie des Jeux floraux du Genêt d’Or à Perpignan.

Autodidacte, Charles Grando est initié à la grammaire et au vocabulaire catalan par Louis Pastre, instituteur . Il devient membre de la Société d’études catalanes (il en est secrétaire entre 1915 et 1921) et publie régulièrement dans la Revue Catalane, organe de la société.

En 1917, il obtient le prix de la section philologique de l’Institut d’Estudis Catalans pour son ouvrage El català al Rosselló.

Après la fin de la Société d’Études Catalanes en 1921, il fait partie de la Colla del Rosselló, puis participe en 1926 à la création des Jeux floraux du Genêt d’Or, émanation du Félibrige à Perpignan. Il s’agit d’encourager et d’honorer les poètes et artistes locaux, de défendre la langue et la tradition catalanes. Charles Grando sera successivement rapporteur, président, secrétaire perpétuel de l’Académie du Genêt d’Or pendant cinquante ans beef steak marinade tenderizer. Il participe à la fondation de la Maintenance catalane du Félibrige en 1930, il devient président de la Société agricole, scientifique et littéraire des Pyrénées-Orientales, de l’Association polytechnique de Perpignan et membre d’honneur du Groupe Roussillonnais d’Etudes Catalanes (GREC) créé en 1960.

Il collabore à de nombreuses revues et journaux (Revue catalane, Le Feu, L’éveil catalan, la Tramontane running belts reviews…) et participe aux manifestations culturelles du Roussillon, infatigable animateur de la Renaissance catalane avec Jean Amade et Joseph-Sébastien Pons.

Auteur de travaux divers, poète, philologue, dramaturge, conférencier, folkloriste, Charles Grando est une personnalité qui a marqué la vie culturelle du Roussillon.

Ses archives et sa bibliothèque sont conservées à la Bibliothèque Universitaire Droit-Lettres de l’université de Perpignan depuis 1977.

Sur ses oeuvres

sur Estudi Perpinyà 1350

Hedgardo Marín

Hedgardo Marín Arroyo (21 de febrero de 1993 stainless steel water container, Guadalajara, Jalisco) es un futbolista mexicano que juega como defensa central y su actual equipo es el Club Deportivo Guadalajara de la Liga MX.

Hedgardo Marín fruto de las fuerzas básicas del Club Deportivo Guadalajara, visoriado por el técnico José Luis Real que lo llevó al primer equipo para el Clausura 2014, debutó como profesional el 15 de enero de 2014 en un partido contra Leones Negros de la Universidad de Guadalajara dentro de la Copa MX en el estadio Omnilife where to buy waterproof pouch, y finalmente el 27 de abril de 2014, el director técnico argentino Ricardo Lavolpe lo debuta como titular en un partido contra el Club de Fútbol Monterrey correspondiente a la última jornada de esa edición de la Liga MX plastic reusable water bottles. Con selecciones nacionales menores ha tenido oportunidad de disputar La Copa Mundial de Fútbol Sub-20 de 2013 en Turquía, así como el Torneo Esperanzas de Toulon en su edición de 2014.​

En el 2013 fue incluido en la lista de 23 jugadores para la Mundial Sub-20 2013 en Turquía.

En el 2014 fue incluido en la lista de jugadores que representaron a México en el Juegos Centroamericanos y del Caribe, Veracruz 2014. Portando el gafete de capitán.​

El 29 de septiembre de 2016 el técnico Juan Carlos Osorio lo convoca para los 2 partidos del Tri en contra de Panamá y Nueva Zelanda.

Debuta con la Selección Mayor el 6 de octubre de 2016 ante Nueva Zelanda en la victoria de México por 2-1 best water bottle to drink.

Ethiraj College for Women

Ethiraj College for Women is a degree-granting college for women in Chennai, India, managed by the Ethiraj College Trust. It was founded in 1948 by Shri. V. L. Ethiraj.

Ethiraj College for Women, started in 1948.

Shri. V. L. Ethiraj was born on 18 July 1890, in a very respectable and affluent family. His father, Thiru. Lakshmana Swamy Mudaliar, was a well-known philanthropist of Thottapalayam village in Vellore District. Shri. V. L. Ethiraj graduated from Presidency College, Chennai. He was tutored by Dr. Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan best running belt water, the first president of the Republic India. A magnanimous and a wealthy barrister, he took his legal degree from University of Dublin and, on his return to India, joined The Madras Bar. In a short period he built up a lucrative practice by his efficiency and was the first Indian to be appointed as Crown Prosecutor by the British Government.

Situated in the heart of the city of Chennai in 9 acres of campus area.

Founded in 1948, the formative years witnessed a strong foundation through introduction of undergraduate courses in Economics, Botany, Chemistry, History, Zoology and English Literature along with the infrastructural facilities, resulting in the construction of the Science Block, Hostel, Open Air Theatre and the Old Library Block. The landmark development of this decade was the auditorium, which to this day remains the pride of the college. The decade of 1968–1978 saw the growth of the college with the introduction of Commerce, Mathematics and Physics at the UG level and a number of PG courses and the construction of PG block.

A significant development of the next phase was the introduction of evening college in 1981. The thrust was on research with introduction of M.Phil and Ph.D. programmes. The addition of the Annexe Campus of 59 grounds augured the new direction in the growth of the College. 1990-2000 saw a steady growth with the introduction job-oriented self-funded UG courses like Corporate Secretaryship, B.Com (Bank Management), BBA (Business Administration), B.Sc. Biochemistry, B.Sc. Microbiology and M.Sc. Plant Biology & Plant Bio-technology and the introduction of post-graduate AICTE approved courses MBA and MCA, which was an important milestone in the growth of the college. The construction of New Science Block and dormitories in the hostel marked the new phase of development.

The beginning of the next decade witnessed the Day College becoming autonomous and the momentous growth of the College in its infrastructure: the N & D block, COE block, New Library, New hostel, Business Studies and Information Technology Block, all adding up to 2,66,000 Sqft. Besides these, the College has a Language Lab, Instrumentation Centre, Online access to the holdings in the Library, Internet Centre and Computer Labs. The College entered the global arena by signing an MOU with British Council for teaching Business English Certificate and First Certificate in English waterproof case bag.

The core competency has been strengthened in many ways to suit the changing scenario. Botany was converted into Plant Biology and Plant Biotechnology, one section of History into Tourism and Travel Management, two sections of Zoology into Advanced Zoology and Biotechnology. In the self-financing stream, Economics into Business Economics, one section of English to English and Communication Skills. At the PG level a course in Human Rights and Duties Education was introduced during 2002. New courses namely, B.Sc. Clinical Nutrition, M.Sc. Physics, M.Sc. Foods & Nutrition were also introduced from 2005 in the self-finance stream. In 2006 courses namely B.sc. Visual Communication, M.Sc. Biochemistry & M.Sc. Microbiology were introduced.

Stenbråten skole

Koordinater:

Stenbråten skole er en barneskole i bydel Søndre Nordstrand i nærheten av Mortensrud i Oslo.

Ammerud · Bakås · Bekkelaget · Berg · Bestum · Bjørndal · Bogstad · Bolteløkka · Bryn · Brynseng · Bygdøy · Disen · Ekeberg · Ellingsrudåsen · Fernanda Nissen · Furuset · Gamlebyen · Godlia · Grefsen · Grindbakken · Grorud · Grünerløkka · Hallagerbakken · Hasle · Huseby · Høybråten · Jeriko · Kampen · Kjelsås · Klemetsrud · Korsvoll · Kringsjå&nbsp tenderizer for beef;· Lakkegata · Lilleaker · Lilleborg · Ljan · Lofsrud · Lusetjern · Lutvann · Lysejordet · Løren · Manglerud · Maridalen · Mortensrud · Munkerud · Møllergata · Nedre Bekkelaget · Nordstrand · Nordtvet · Nøklevann · Prinsdal · Refstad · Rosenholm · Rustad · Rødtvet · Seterbråten · Sinsen · Skjønnhaug · Skøyen · Slemdal · Smestad · Stenbråten · Stig · Stovner · Svarttjern · Svendstuen · Sørkedalen · Teglverket · Tiurleiken · Tonsenhagen · Toppåsen · Trasop · Trosterud · Tveita · Tøyen · Tåsen · Ullevål · Vahl · Vestli&nbsp waist bag with bottle holder;· Vinderen · Voksen · Vålerenga · Østensjø

Apalløkka · Bjørnholt · Brannfjell · Ellingsrud · Engebråten · Frydenberg · Granstangen · Groruddalen · Haugenstua · Haugerud · Hauketo · Holmlia · Hovseter · Jordal · Lofsrud · Midtstuen · Nordberg · Ris · Skullerud · Skøyenåsen · Stasjonsfjellet · Tokerud · Vestre Aker · Øraker

Abildsø · Bjølsen · Bjørnsletta · Bjøråsen · Bøler · Gran · Haugen · Høyenhall · Ila · Karlsrud · Kastellet · Lambertseter · Lindeberg · Linderud · Majorstuen · Marienlyst · Nordpolen · Nordseter · Nordvoll · Oppsal · Rommen · Ruseløkka · Sagene · Uranienborg · Veitvet · Årvoll

Fyrstikkalleen

Elverhøy · Brusetkollen · Haukåsen · Lønnebakken&nbsp running drink bottle belt;· Nordmarka skole · Nordvoll · Nordre Aker · Oslo musikk- og kulturskole · Oslo Sjøskole · Sedsvoll · Sollerudstranda · Sykehusskolen i Oslo · Ullevålsveien · Vetland · Voksentoppen

Liste over tidligere offentlige skoler i Oslo

Cicârlău

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Géolocalisation sur la carte : Roumanie

Géolocalisation sur la carte : Roumanie

Cicârlău (Nagysikárló en hongrois) est une commune roumaine du județ de Maramureș, dans la région historique de Transylvanie et dans la région de développement du Nord-Ouest.

La commune de Cicârlău est située sur la rive gauche de la rivière Someș, affluent de la Tisa, à 15 km à l’ouest de Baia Mare, la préfecture du județ. La commune est traversée par la route nationale DN1C qui relie Baia Mare et Satu Mare.

Elle est composée des villages de Cicârlău (1 834 habitants en 2002), de Bârgău (280 habitants en 2002), de Ilba (1 412 habitants en 2002) et de Handalui Ilbei (487 habitants en 2002).

Après son incroporatiion au territoire roumain à la suite du Traité de Trianon et du démembrement de l’Empire Austro-hongrois, la commune a fait partie du județ de Satu Mare glass water bottle canada. Elle n’a rejoint le județ de Maramureș qu’après la Seconde Guerre mondiale best sports water bottle.

En 1910, la commune comptait 2 323 Roumains (86,5 % de la population totale) et 353 Hongrois (13,1 %).

En 1930, la commune comptait 2 575 Roumains (92,1 %), 115 Hongrois (4,1 %) et une petite communauté juive de 63 personnes (2,3 %) qui fut exterminée durant la Shoah.

En 2002, 3 930 Roumains (97,9 %) habitaient la commune ainsi que 78 Hongrois (1 running belt number holder,9 %).

Special member state territories and the European Union

Several European Union member states have territories which, for historical, geographical, or political reasons, enjoy special status within or outside the European Union. These statuses may have a wide range of derogation from EU policies. Most of the territories which are outside the EU nonetheless have a special relationship with the EU.

The outermost regions (OMR) are territories forming part of a member state water glass bottles wholesale, situated a significant distance from mainland Europe, which are part of the EU. According to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, both primary and secondary European Union law applies automatically to these territories, with possible derogations to take account of their “structural social and economic situation … which is compounded by their remoteness, insularity, small size, difficult topography and climate, economic dependence on a few products, the permanence and combination of which severely restrain their development”. All form part of the EU’s customs area, however some fall outside of Schengen Area (all but Canary Islands, Madeira and the Azores) and European Union Value Added Tax Area (EU VAT Area).

Seven outermost regions were recognised at the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. The Treaty of Lisbon included two additional territories (Saint Barthélemy and Saint Martin) in 2007, both of which seceded from one of the original outermost regions (Guadeloupe). Saint Barthélemy changed its status from OMR to OCT with effect from 1 January 2012. Mayotte, which was formerly an OCT, joined the EU as a OMR with effect from 1 January 2014. As of April 2014, a total of nine territories (six French, two Portuguese, and one Spanish) were registered to have OMR status.

Azores and Madeira are two groups of Portuguese islands in the Atlantic. Azores and Madeira are integral parts of the Portuguese Republic, but both have the special status as Autonomous Regions, with a degree of self-governance. While derogations from the application of EU law could apply, none do. Their VAT is lower than the rest of Portugal, but they are not outside the EU VAT Area.

The Canary Islands are a Spanish archipelago off the African coast which form one of the 17 Autonomous Communities of Spain–the country’s principal first-level administrative division. They are outside the EU VAT Area. The Canary Islands are the most populated and economically strongest territory of all the outermost regions in the European Union. The outermost regions office for support and information is located in these islands, in the city of Las Palmas on the island of Gran Canaria.

French Guiana, Guadeloupe, Martinique, Mayotte, and Réunion are five French overseas departments (and also overseas regions) which under French law are, for the most part, treated as integral parts of the Republic. The euro is legal tender; however, they are outside the Schengen Area and the EU VAT Area.

Mayotte is the newest of the five overseas departments having changed from an overseas collectivity, with OCT status, on 31 March 2011. It became an outermost region and thus part of the EU on 1 January 2014.

Saint Martin is the only overseas collectivity of France with the status of being an outermost region of the EU. As with the French overseas departments, the euro is legal tender in Saint Martin, and it is outside the Schengen Area and the EU VAT Area.

On 22 February 2007, Saint Martin and Saint Barthélemy were broken away from the French overseas department of Guadeloupe to form new overseas collectivities. As a consequence their EU status was unclear for a time. While a report issued by the French parliament suggested that the islands remained within the EU as outermost regions, European Commission documents listed them as being outside the European Community. The legal status of the islands was clarified on the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty which listed them as an outermost region. However, Saint Barthélemy ceased being an outermost region and left the EU, to become an OCT, on 1 January 2012.

The overseas countries and territories (OCT) are dependent territories that have a special relationship with one of the member states of the EU, and have been explicitly invited by the EU treaty to join the EU-OCT Association (OCTA). They were listed in Annex II acc. to Article 198 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which aside from inviting them to join OCTA, also provided them the opportunity to opt into EU provisions on the freedom of movement for workers and freedom of establishment. Yet, the freedom of establishment is limited by Article 203 TFEU and the respective Council Decision on OCTs (). Its Article 51(1)(a) prescribes only that “the Union shall accord to natural and legal persons of the OCTs a treatment no less favourable than the most favourable treatment applicable to like natural and legal persons of any third country with whom the Union concludes or has concluded an economic integration agreement.” Again this can be, according to Article 51(2)(b) limited. The obligations provided for in paragraph 1 of this Article shall not apply to treatment granted under measures providing for recognition of qualifications, licences or prudential measures in accordance with Article VII of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) or the GATS Annex on Financial Services.

The OCTs are not subject to the EU’s common external customs tariffs but may claim customs on goods imported from the EU on a non-discriminatory basis. They are not part of the EU and the EU acquis does not apply to them, though those joining OCTA are required to respect the detailed rules and procedures outlined by this association agreement (Council Decision 2013/755/EU). OCTA members are entitled to ask for EU financial support.

When the Rome Treaty was signed in March 1957, a total of 15 OCTs existed: French West Africa, French Equatorial Africa, Saint Pierre and Miquelon, Comoros Archipelago, French Madagascar, French Somaliland, New Caledonia, French Polynesia, French Southern and Antarctic Lands, French Togoland, French Cameroons, Belgian Congo, Ruanda-Urundi, Trust Territory of Somalia, Netherlands New Guinea. The list was since then revised multiple times, and comprised—as noted by the Lisbon Treaty—25 OCTs in 2007. One of the French territories subsequently switched status from OMR to OCT (Saint Barthélemy), while another French territory switched from OCT to OMR (Mayotte). As of July 2014, there are still 25 OCTs (twelve with the United Kingdom, six with France, six with the Netherlands and one with Denmark) of which 22 have joined OCTA. The three OCTs which are not part of OCTA (British Antarctic Territory, British Indian Ocean Territory and South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands) do not have a permanent population.

There are twelve overseas territories of the United Kingdom (all but Gibraltar, which, unlike the other territories, is part of the European Union (see below), and the Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia on Cyprus), namely:

Bermuda did not – despite having OCT status as defined by the Rome Treaty – join the EU-OCT Association (OCTA) together with the other overseas territories in November 2001, but instead only joined OCTA on 2 July 2014. As of July 2014, it is only the three remote areas without any permanent population (British Antarctic Territory, British Indian Ocean Territory and South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands), that are not members of OCTA. All citizens of the British overseas territories, except those residing at Britain’s sovereign bases in Cyprus, were granted full British citizenship by the British Overseas Territories Act 2002, and are consequently citizens of the European Union.

A total of six French overseas territories currently have OCT status within EU.

The French Southern and Antarctic Lands (which also include the French Scattered Islands in the Indian Ocean, and the French claim of Adélie Land in Antarctica) is a French Overseas Territory but has no permanent population. It has sui generis status within France.

Saint-Pierre and Miquelon, Saint Barthélemy, French Polynesia, and Wallis and Futuna are overseas collectivities (formerly referred to as overseas territories) of France, while New Caledonia is a “sui generis collectivity”. Saint Barthélemy and Saint-Pierre and Miquelon use the euro, while New Caledonia, French Polynesia and Wallis and Futuna use the CFP Franc, a currency which is tied to the euro and guaranteed by France. Natives of the collectivities are European citizens owing to their French citizenship and elections to the European Parliament are held in the collectivities.

On 22 February 2007, Saint Barthélemy and Saint Martin were separated from the French overseas department of Guadeloupe to form new overseas collectivities. As a consequence, their EU status was unclear for a time. While a report issued by the French parliament suggested that the islands remained within the EU as outermost regions, European Commission documents listed them as being outside the European Community. The legal status of the islands was clarified on the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty which listed them as outermost regions. However, Saint Barthélemy ceased being an outermost region and left the EU, to become an OCT, on 1 January 2012. The change was made to facilitate trade with countries outside the EU, notably the United States, and was made possible by a provision of the Lisbon Treaty which allows the European Council to change the EU status of a Danish, Dutch, or French territory on the initiative of the member state concerned.

Six territories of the Netherlands — all of which are Caribbean islands — have OCT status. As such, they benefit from being able to have their own export and import policy to and from the EU, while still having access to receive various EU funds (i.e. from the European Development Fund). The inhabitants of the islands are EU citizens owing to their Dutch citizenship, with the right to vote in elections to the European Parliament. Initially they did not have voting rights for such elections, but the European Court of Justice granted them such rights, when they ruled their exclusion from the franchise was contrary to EU law, as all other Dutch citizens resident outside the EU did have the right to vote. None of the islands use the euro as their currency. The US dollar is used on Bonaire, St. Eustatius and Saba, while Curaçao and St. Maarten utilize their own shared currency the Antillean guilder, and finally the currency of Aruba is the Aruban florin.

Aruba, Curaçao, and Sint Maarten are classified as “countries” under Dutch law and have considerable internal autonomy. In June 2008, the Dutch government published a report on the effect on the islands were they to join the EU as outermost regions. It concluded that it would be for the islands themselves to weigh up the advantages and disadvantages of becoming part of the EU as outermost regions and that nothing would be done absent the islands specifically requesting it.

Bonaire, Sint Eustatius, and Saba (collectively called Caribbean Netherlands) are “special municipalities” of the Netherlands proper. Their current OCT status, and the prospect of advancing their status to become part of the EU as new OMRs (outermost regions), has been scheduled to be reviewed by the Dutch parliament in 2015, as part of the planned review of the Dutch law (WOLBES and FINBES) concerning the quality of their recently implemented new public administration bodies. In October 2015, the review concluded the present legal structures for governance and integration with European Netherlands was not working well within the framework of WolBES, but no recommendations were made in regards of whether a switch from OCT to OMR status would help improve this situation.

The islands inherited their OCT status from the Netherlands Antilles which was dissolved in 2010. The Netherlands Antilles were initially specifically excluded from all association with the EEC by reason of a protocol attached to the Treaty of Rome, allowing the Netherlands to ratify on behalf of the Netherlands in Europe and Netherlands New Guinea only, which it subsequently did meet tenderizer. Following the entry into force of the Convention on the association of the Netherlands Antilles with the European Economic Community on 1 October 1964, however, the Netherlands Antilles became OCTs.

Greenland joined the then European Community in 1973 as a county along with Denmark, but voted to leave the EC in 1982 and left in 1985, to become an OCT. Citizens of Greenland are, nonetheless, EU citizens owing to their Danish citizenship. The EU–Greenland relationship is a comprehensive partnership, which is complementary to the OCT association arrangements under “Council Decision 2013/755/EU”; based specifically on “Council Decision 2014/137 of 14 March 2014” (outlining the relations) and the Fisheries Partnership Agreement of 30 July 2006.

While the outermost regions and the overseas countries and territories fall into structured categories to which common mechanisms apply, this is not true of all the special territories. Some territories have ad hoc arrangements in their relationship with the EU. Some of these could be called “protocol territories”[citation needed] as their status is governed by protocols attached to their respective countries’ accession treaties. The rest owe their status to European Union legislative provisions which exclude the territories from the application of the legislation concerned. Many were opted out from either the VAT area or the customs union or both.

Åland, a group of islands belonging to Finland, but with partial autonomy, located between Sweden and Finland, with a Swedish-speaking population, joined the EU along with Finland in 1995. The islands had a separate referendum on accession and like the Finnish mainland voted in favour.

EU law, including the fundamental four freedoms, applies to Åland. However, there are some derogations due to the islands’ special status. Åland is outside the VAT area and is exempt from common rules in relation to turnover taxes, excise duties and indirect taxation. In addition, to protect the local economy, the treaty of accession allows for a concept of hembygdsrätt/kotiseutuoikeus (regional citizenship) football player uniform. Consequently, there are restrictions on the holding of property and real estate, the right of establishment for business purposes and limitations on who can provide services in Åland, for people not holding this status. The status may be obtained by any Finnish citizen legally resident in Åland for 5 years who can demonstrate an adequate knowledge of the Swedish language.

The German exclave town of Büsingen am Hochrhein, fully surrounded by Switzerland, is in customs union with the latter non-EU country. The euro is legal tender, although the Swiss franc is preferred. Büsingen is excluded from the EU customs union and VAT area. Swiss VAT and sales taxes are paid.

The Italian exclave village of Campione d’Italia is enclaved by Switzerland’s Ticino canton as well as Lake Lugano (or Ceresio), and is a comune in the Province of Como, whilst Livigno, a small and remote mountain resort town, is a comune in the Province of Sondrio. Both comuni are part of the Lombardy region. Although part of the EU, they are excluded from the customs union and VAT area, with Livigno’s tax status dating back to Napoleonic times. Moreover, the only legal tender in Campione d’Italia is the Swiss franc, although in practice shops and restaurants accept payments also in euro – and their bills present dual price display in both Euros and Francs.

Ceuta and Melilla are two Spanish cities on the North African coast. They are part of the EU but they are excluded from the common agricultural and fisheries policies. They are also outside the customs union and VAT area, but no customs are levied on goods exported from the Union into either Ceuta and Melilla, and certain goods originating in Ceuta and Melilla are exempt from customs charges.

While nominally part of the Schengen Area, Spain performs identity checks on all sea and air passengers leaving the enclaves for elsewhere in the Schengen Area.

The Bailiwick of Jersey and Bailiwick of Guernsey—which form the Channel Islands—are Crown dependencies, under the sovereignty of the British monarch and thus part of the remaining British Empire. The islands take part in the EU freedom of movement of goods but not labour, services or capital. They are outside the VAT area, but inside the customs union.

Channel Islanders are British citizens and hence European citizens. As a result, they can travel freely within the EU, and all European citizens can travel to the islands without restrictions. However, the islands do not participate in the freedom of movement of labour, and as a result their citizens are not entitled to work or reside within the EU unless they are directly connected (through birth, or descent from a parent or grandparent) with the United Kingdom. After five years continuous residence in the United Kingdom, islanders are entitled to participate in the freedom of movement of labour or services throughout the EU.

The Isle of Man is a Crown dependency, under the sovereignty of the British monarch. The island takes part in the EU freedom of movement of goods but not labour, services or capital. The Isle of Man is inside the VAT area and the customs union.

Manx people are British citizens and hence European citizens. As a result, they can travel freely within the EU, and all European citizens can travel to the Isle of Man without restrictions. However, the island does not participate in the freedom of movement of labour, and as a result its citizens are not entitled to work or reside within the EU unless they are directly connected (through birth, or descent from a parent or grandparent) with the United Kingdom. After five years continuous residence in the United Kingdom, Manx people are entitled to participate in the freedom of movement of labour or services throughout the EU.

When the Republic of Cyprus became part of the European Union on 1 May 2004, the northern third of the island was outside of the effective control of its government due to the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, a United Nations buffer zone of varying width separated the two parts, and a further 3% of the island was taken up by UK sovereign bases (under British sovereignty since the Treaty of Establishment in 1960). Two protocols to the Treaty of Accession 2003 – numbers 3 and 10, known as the “Sovereign Base Areas Protocol” and the “Cyprus Protocol” respectively – reflect this complex situation.

EU law only applies fully to the part of the island that is effectively controlled by the government of the Republic of Cyprus. EU law is suspended in the northern third of the island (the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, whose independence is recognised only by Turkey) by article 1(1) of the Cyprus Protocol. If the island is reunified, the Council of the European Union will repeal the suspension by a decision. Four months after such a decision has been adopted, new elections to the European Parliament will be held on the island to elect Cypriot representatives from the whole of the island.

Cypriot nationality law applies to the entire island and is accordingly available to the inhabitants of Northern Cyprus and the British sovereign base areas on the same basis as to those born in the area controlled by the Republic of Cyprus. Citizens of the Republic of Cyprus living in Northern Cyprus are EU citizens and are entitled to vote in elections to the European Parliament; however, elections to that Parliament are not organised in Northern Cyprus.[citation needed]

The United Kingdom has two sovereign base areas on Cyprus, namely Akrotiri and Dhekelia. Unlike other British overseas territories, they are not listed as Overseas Countries and Territories under the Treaty of Rome and their inhabitants (who are entitled to British Overseas Territories Citizenship) have never been entitled to British citizenship.

Prior to Cypriot accession to the EU in 2004, EU law did not apply to the sovereign base areas. This position was changed by the Cypriot accession treaty and EU law, while still not applying in principle, applies to the extent necessary to implement a protocol attached to that treaty. This protocol applies EU law relating to the Common Agricultural Policy, customs, indirect taxation, social policy and justice and home affairs to the sovereign base areas. The sovereign base areas’ authorities have also made provision for the unilateral application of directly applicable EU law. The UK also agreed in the Protocol to keep enough control of the external (i.e. off-island and northern Cyprus) borders of the base areas to ensure that the border between the sovereign base areas and the Republic of Cyprus can remain fully open and will not have to be policed as an external EU border. Consequently, the sovereign base areas will become a de facto part of the Schengen Area if and when Cyprus implements it. The base areas are already de facto members of the eurozone due to their previous use of the Cypriot pound before it was replaced by the euro in 2008.

As pointed out above, inhabitants of the sovereign base areas have never been entitled to British citizenship or to the European Union citizenship that would go with it, however Cypriot nationality law extends to Cypriots in the Sovereign Base Areas, meaning Cypriot residents, as citizens of the Republic of Cyprus, are entitled to EU citizenship. Just under half of the population of the sovereign base areas are Cypriots, the rest are British military personnel, support staff and their dependants. In a declaration attached to the Treaty of Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus of 1960 the British government undertook not to allow new settlement of people in the sovereign base areas other than for temporary purposes.

The United Nations buffer zone between north and south Cyprus ranges in width from a few metres in central Nicosia to several kilometres in the countryside. While it is nominally under the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus, it is effectively administered by the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). The population of the zone is 8,686 (as of October 2007), and one of the mandates of UNFICYP is “to encourage the fullest possible resumption of normal civilian activity in the buffer zone”. Article 2.1 of the Cyprus Protocol allows the European Council to determine to what extent the provisions of EU law apply in the buffer zone.

The Faroe Islands are not part of the EU, and they have not been part of the EU since Denmark joined the community in 1973. Danish citizens residing on the islands are not considered citizens of a member state within the meaning of the treaties or, consequently, citizens of the European Union. However, Faroese people may become EU citizens by changing their residence to the Danish mainland.

The Faroe Islands are not part of the Schengen Area, and Schengen visas are not valid. However, the islands are part of the Nordic Passport Union and the Schengen Agreement provides that travellers passing between the islands and the Schengen Area are not to be treated as passing the external frontier of the Area. This means that there is an identity check at air or boat travel to the islands where Nordic citizens on intra-Nordic travel need no passport, only showing the ticket plus identity card.

Gibraltar is a British overseas territory located near the southernmost tip of the Iberian Peninsula and overlooking the Strait of Gibraltar, sharing a border with Spain to the north. It is part of the EU, having joined the European Economic Community under the United Kingdom in 1973. Article 355(3) (ex Article 299(4)) applies the treaty to “the European territories for whose external relations a Member State is responsible”, a provision which in practice only applies to Gibraltar. Although it is part of the EU, Gibraltar is outside the customs union and VAT area and is exempted from the Common Agricultural Policy; it does not form part of the Schengen Area. As a separate jurisdiction to the UK, Gibraltar’s government and parliament are responsible for the transposition of EU law into local law. In 2016 Gibraltar voted “remain” in the UK EU membership referendum; however Gibraltar’s membership is not distinct from the UK’s and Gibraltar is bound by the overall result of “leave”

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Owing to a declaration lodged by the United Kingdom with the EEC in 1982, Gibraltarians were to be counted as British nationals for the purposes of Community law. This was notwithstanding that they were not all, at the time, British citizens but many were British Overseas Territories citizens. As such Gibraltarians have enjoyed European Union citizenship from its creation by the Maastricht Treaty. Since 21 May 2002, all Gibraltarians have been granted the right to register a full British citizenship, while those who previously held a British Overseas Territory citizenship automatically were converted now to have a full British citizenship. Any child born in Gibraltar after 21 May 2002 will automatically become a British citizen, if just one of its parents is a British citizen or a Gibraltarian resident.

Despite their status as EU citizens resident in the EU, elections to the European Parliament were not held in Gibraltar until 2004. The inclusion resulted from the European Court of Human Rights’ 1999 ruling in Matthews v. United Kingdom which deemed that Gibraltar’s exclusion violated Article 3 of Protocol 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights. In the 2004 European Parliament election the territory formed part of the South West England constituency of the United Kingdom. The inclusion was unsuccessfully challenged by Spain before the European Court of Justice.

Like the UK, Gibraltar does not form part of the Schengen Area and, as a result, the border between Spain and Gibraltar is an external Schengen border through which Spain is legally obliged to perform full entrance and exit controls. However Gibraltar does participate in certain police and judicial cooperation aspects of the Schengen acquis in line with the UK’s request to participate in the same measures.

With respect to the application of EU law to Gibraltar, the governments of Spain and the United Kingdom made the following Declaration which is appended (as Declaration 55) to the Treaty on European Union: “The Treaties apply to Gibraltar as a European territory for whose external relations a Member State is responsible. This shall not imply changes in the respective positions of the Member States concerned.”

Helgoland is an island of Germany situated in the North Sea 70 km (43 mi) off the German north-western coast. It is part of the EU, but is excluded from the customs union and the VAT area.

Mount Athos is an autonomous monastic region of Greece. Greece’s EU accession treaty provides that Mount Athos maintains its centuries-old special legal status, guaranteed by article 105 of the Greek Constitution. It is part of the customs union but outside the VAT area. Notwithstanding that a special permit is required to enter the peninsula and that there is a prohibition on the admittance of women, it is part of the Schengen Area. The monastery has certain rights to house monks from countries outside the EU. A declaration attached to Greece’s accession treaty to the Schengen Agreement states that Mount Athos’s “special status” should be taken into account in the application of the Schengen rules.

The Saimaa Canal and Värska–Ulitina road are two of several distinct travel arrangements that exist or existed because of changes in borders over the course of the 20th century, where transport routes and installations ended up on the wrong side of the border. Some have become superfluous thanks to the Schengen Agreement.

Finland leases the 19.6 km-long Russian part of the Saimaa Canal from Russia and is granted extraterritoriality rights. The area is not part of the EU, it is a special part of Russia. Under the treaty signed by Finnish and Russian governments, Russian law is in force with a few exceptions concerning maritime rules and the employment of canal staff which fall under Finnish jurisdiction. There are also special rules concerning vessels travelling to Finland via the canal. Russian visas are not required for just passing through the canal, but a passport is needed and it is checked at the border. Euros are accepted for the canal fees. Prior to the 50-year lease renewal coming into effect in February 2012, the Maly Vysotsky Island had also been leased and managed by Finland. Since then it has been fully managed by Russian authorities, and is no longer part of the concession territory.

The road from Värska to Ulitina in Estonia, traditionally the only road to the Ulitina area, goes through Russian territory for one kilometre (0.6 mi) of its length, an area called Saatse Boot. This road has no border control, but there is no connection to any other road in Russia. It is not permissible to stop or walk along the road. This area is a part of Russia but is also a de facto part of the Schengen area.

Many currently independent states or parts of such were previously territories of the following EU members since the latter joined the EU or, previously the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC):

Most of these territories seceded before the implementation of the Maastricht treaty in 1993 and the following years, meaning that cooperation like the EU citizenship, the VAT union or the Eurozone did not exist, so it made less difference to be a special territory then.

These were:

Additionally in Europe there were special territories in the past that had different status than their “mainland”, because of various reasons, but now are part of a member state. Some of these territories were as follows:

The following areas are still special member state territories, but have changed their status. See their entries in the article for details.

Some European countries are strongly connected to the European Union, through the European Economic Area or similar agreements. These countries are Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland, the member states of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). They are inside the single market (with exceptions) and the Schengen area, but outside the Eurozone, customs territory, and VAT area. Norway and Switzerland have special areas.

This table summarises the various components of EU laws applied in the EU member states and their sovereign territories. Member states that do not have special-status territories are not included (as there the EU law applies fully with the exception of the opt-outs in the European Union and states under a safeguard clause or transitional period). Some territories of EFTA member states also have a special status in regard to EU laws applied as is the case with some European microstates.

Summary for member states that do not have special-status territories, but do not participate in certain EU provisions as they are either not yet eligible or have an opt-out.

A list of the remaining member states which do not have special-status territories, and participate in all EU provisions:

 Austria
 Belgium
 Estonia
 Latvia
 Lithuania
 Luxembourg
 Malta
 Slovakia
 Slovenia

The High Contracting Parties,

Anxious, at the time of signature of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, to define the scope of the provisions of Article 227 of this Treaty in respect of the Kingdom of the Netherlands,

Have agreed upon the following provisions, which shall be annexed to this Treaty:

The Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, by reason of the constitutional structure of the Kingdom resulting from the Statute of 29 December 1954, shall, by way of derogation from Article 227, be entitled to ratify the Treaty on behalf of the Kingdom in Europe and Netherlands New Guinea only.

Done at Rome this twenty-fifth day of March in the year one thousand nine hundred and fifty-seven.

Federación Boliviana de Natación

Si has iniciado sesión, puedes ayudarte del corrector ortográfico, activándolo en: Mis preferencias → Accesorios → NavegaciónCheck mark.png El corrector ortográfico resalta errores ortográficos con un fondo rojo.

La Federación Boliviana de Natación o FEBONA es la federación de natación de Bolivia.

La FEBONA está afiliada a la Federación Internacional de Natación (FINA).​ La sudante de la federación es Silvia Crespo.

La FEBONA está a cargo de regular y controlar los campeonatos nacionales bolivianos de Natación los cuales son:

Es el campeonato más importante del país y está disponible para todos los competidores mayores de 13 años, este campeonato es de carácter absoluto es decir sin categorías, se realiza una vez cada año y puede tener como sede a cualquier ciudad capital de departamento en Bolivia excepto Cobija, sin embargo usualmente se realiza en las ciudades de Sucre classic replica football shirts, Santa Cruz de la Sierra y Cochabamba por la calidad de sus piscinas water bottle backpack running.

Es un torneo nacional para nadadores de 10 a 25 años de edad cuyas marcas en 2 pruebas deben alcanzar el 75% de aproximación al récord nacional al hacer eso entran a la categoría Promocional y están aptos para ir al torneo. El nacional Promocional tiene como sede cualquier ciudad capital de departamento en Bolivia y se lleva a cabo 2 veces al año en su versión apertura y clausura

Es un torneo nacional para los mejores nadadores de Bolivia desde los 13 años de edad cuyas marcas alcancen el 85% de aproximación al récord nacional al hacer esto entran en la categoría Élite y son aptos para participar del torneo élite el cual tiene como sede cualquier ciudad capital de departamento en Bolivia y se lleva a cabo 2 veces al año en sus versiones clausura y apertura how to tenderize steak fast.

Es un campeonato nacional en el cual pueden participr todos los nadadores del club Campeón y el club subcampeón de cada Asociación departamental. Estos compiten entre si y el ganador se proclama club Campeón de Bolivia

Es un torneo nacional para aquellos nadadores que tengan más de 25 años de edad ya sean Promocionales o élites

Campeonato nacional para nadadores de categoría preinfantil (menos de 10 años de edad)

La FEBONA se subdivide en 8 asociaciones departamentales las cuales tienen sus propios campeonatos locales, estas asociaciones son:

El departamento de Pando carece de piscinas reglamentarias y por lo tanto de asociación departamental de natación

Página oficial de la federación boliviana de natación

Franc Witko

Franc Piatrowicz Witko (biał. Франц Пятровіч Вітко, ros. Франц Петрович Витко, Franc Pietrowicz Witko; ur. 3 września 1951 w Hatówkach) – białoruski polityk, działacz Leninowskiego Komunistycznego Związku Młodzieży Białorusi i Komunistycznej Partii Białorusi); kandydat nauk ekonomicznych (odpowiednik polskiego stopnia doktora).

Urodził się 3 września 1951 roku we wsi Hatówki exercise fanny pack, w rejonie głębockim obwodu witebskiego Białoruskiej SRR, ZSRR. W 1972 roku ukończył Białoruski Instytut Mechanizacji Gospodarstwa Wiejskiego, w 1987 roku Mińską Wyższą Szkołę Partyjną, a w 1991 roku Akademię Nauk Społecznych w Bułgarii. Uzyskał stopień kandydata nauk ekonomicznych (odpowiednik polskiego stopnia doktora) large bpa free water bottles. Tytuł jego dysertacji kandydackiej brzmiał: Ekonomiczne problemy wzrostu technicznego poziomu produkcji.

W latach 1972–1975 pracował jako główny inżynier w sowchozie „Uszackij” w obwodzie witebskim. W latach 1975–1978 był sekretarzem Uszackiego Komitetu Rejonowego Leninowskiego Komunistycznego Związku Młodzieży Białorusi. W latach 1978–1980 był instruktorem w Komitecie Centralnym LKZMB. W latach 1980–1983 pełnił funkcję sekretarza

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, a następnie II sekretarza Witebskiego Komitetu Obwodowego LKZMB. W 1983 roku był instruktorem w Witebskim Komitecie Obwodowym Komunistycznej Partii Białorusi (KPB). W latach 1983–1985 był II sekretarzem Postawskiego Komitetu Rejonowego KPB. W latach 1985–1988 był instruktorem w Wydziale Organizacyjnym Komitetu Centralnego KPB. Od 1991 roku był starszym pracownikiem naukowym, kierownikiem działu personalnego w Akademii Zarządzania przy Radzie Ministrów Republiki Białorusi. Pełnił funkcję wiceprzewodniczącego Federacji Związków Zawodowych Białoruskiej.

Franc Witko jest katolikiem.

Egyptian identification card controversy

The Egyptian identification card controversy is a series of events, beginning in the 1990s, that created a de facto state of disenfranchisement for Egyptian Bahá’ís, atheists, agnostics water bottle safety, and other Egyptians who did not identify themselves as Muslim, Christian, or Jewish on government identity documents.

During the period of disenfranchisement, the people affected, who were mostly Bahá’ís, were unable to obtain the necessary government documents to have rights in their country unless they lied about their religion, which conflicted with Bahá’í religious principle. Those affected could not obtain identification cards, birth certificates, death certificates, marriage or divorce certificates, or passports. Without those documents, they could not be employed, educated, treated in hospitals, or vote, among other things.

As of August, 2009, the situation is apparently resolved, following a protracted legal process. Identification documents may now list a dash in place of one of the three recognized religions. Under this compromise solution, the Bahá’í Faith and other beliefs are still unrecognized by the government — Islam, Christianity, and Judaism remain the only recognized religions. The first identification cards were issued to two Bahá’ís under the new policy on August 8, 2009.

Similarly to Iran and several other Muslim-majority countries[citation needed], the Egyptian government requires that its citizens list their religion on government identity documents. Egyptian law recognizes Christianity and Judaism, and provides for some measure of tolerance for these minority groups. Of those who do not identify themselves with one of the three government-recognized religions of Egypt, the largest group of Egyptians with unrecognized beliefs is believed to be the Bahá’ís. Although reliable statistics are not available, the number of Bahá’ís in Egypt has been estimated at about 2,000 as of 2006. Bahá’í institutions and community activities have been illegal under Egyptian law since 1960 by Law 263 at the decree of then-President Gamal Abdel Nasser. Egyptian Bahá’ís have suffered from continual persecution, including the government confiscation of Bahá’í centres, libraries, and cemeteries, and have been charged with apostasy. Although few Egyptians publicly identify as atheists or agnostics, they faced similar difficulties.

All Egyptian citizens must carry national identification cards, which must be presented for any type of government service, such as medical care in a public hospital or processing for a property title or deed as well as to obtain employment, education, banking services, and many other important private transactions. ID cards are also required to pass through police checkpoints, and individuals without such cards are accordingly deprived of freedom of movement. The national identification cards contained a field for religion, with only Islam, Christianity and Judaism acceptable as a religion.

Changing religion on one’s card is extremely difficult, especially for those who are converting from Islam. The Catholic charity Aid to the Church in Need, claims that conversion to Christianity remains prohibited in practise even though Article 46 of the Constitution says that the state guarantees freedom of belief and religion. Therefore, according to the Vital Statistics Office, a Muslim who is baptised a Christian is still a Muslim. This means that a former Muslim cannot change his or her identity papers to show a new religion or name. The charity claims that the lack of a law on conversion from Islam to another religion leaves the matter in the hands of judges who must choose between Sharia and the principle of equality of all citizens before the law.

In 2008 Christian convert Mohammed Higazi was not allowed to have his identity changed to register his change of religion from Islam to Christianity. During a trial to have his religion changed on his identity papers, the opposing lawyer made death threats against Mr Higazi for converting to Christianity. The judge made no objection to these statements and expressed his loathing of the accused because of his conversion. The judge stated that he would never let Higazy be registered as a Christian. He defended his decision by saying that Islam is the principal religion in Egypt.

Major hardship began in the 1990s when the government modernized the electronic processing of national identification cards. Prior to this, Bahá’ís were sometimes able to obtain identification documents from a sympathetic clerk willing to issue a card that left the religious-affiliation slot blank, listed religion as “other” or a dash, or listed “Bahá’í.” Bahá’ís have long refused as a matter of religious principle to falsely list themselves as Muslim, Christian, or Jew.

Electronic processing locked out the possibility of an unlisted religion, or any religious affiliation other than Muslim, Christian, or Jewish. Consequently, adherents of any other faith (or no faith) became unable to obtain any government identification documents (such as national identification cards, birth certificates, death certificates, marriage or divorce certificates, or passports) necessary to exercise their rights in their country unless they lied about their religion.

Without documents, Bahá’ís could not be employed, educated, treated in hospitals, withdraw their own money from a bank, purchase food from state stores, or vote, among other hardships. Bahá’ís became virtual non-citizens, without access to employment, education, and all government services, including hospital care. A number of Bahá’í young people are without valid ID cards, a situation that has forced them out of universities and the army, placing them on the margins of society.

In the 1990s, the Egyptian government announced it would be upgrading its identification card system by issuing computerized cards that would be less susceptible to forgery. This, the government indicated, would help to combat militant Islamic unrest, and improve data collection and access. The government indicated the shift to the new system would be gradual, but set January 2005 as the deadline for everyone to have the new cards — a deadline which was apparently extended to 2006.

The system had apparently undergone modifications since it was set up. In 2003, for example, four Bahá’ís sought and obtained new computerized cards in which the religious affiliation field listed “other” — a designation to which the Bahá’í community does not object. More recently, however, the software had been updated so that only one of the three recognized religions can be entered. If the field is left blank, the computer refuses to issue the card.

The Bahá’í community of Egypt had approached the government on numerous occasions to plead for a simple change in the programming, if not the law, so that they could be issued valid ID cards under the new system. Such pleas, however, had been met with rejection and refusal.

Accordingly, all members of the Egyptian Bahá’í community faced the prospect of being left wholly without proper ID cards by 2006 — a situation in which they would essentially be denied all rights of citizenship, and, indeed, would be faced with the inability even to withdraw their own money from the bank, get medical treatment at public hospitals, or purchase food from state stores.

As the new cards were being issued, the government had asked young people to start coming in for the new cards, and a number of Bahá’í youth had accordingly been stripped of paper identification cards. Once stripped of ID cards, the Bahá’í youth essentially become prisoners in their own homes, since the authorities often set up evening checkpoints to verify the identity of young men. Individuals without proper ID face detention. Likewise, young people without ID cards are denied entrance and continuing enrollment in colleges and universities, as well as service in the armed forces.

On April 4, 2006, a three-judge panel of the Egyptian Administrative Court upheld the right of a Bahá’í couple to lawfully state their religion on their ID cards. The cards had been confiscated by the government after the couple sought to have their passports updated to include their daughters. The couple, Husam Izzat Musa and Ranya Enayat Rushdy, sued, stating that the confiscation of the cards was illegal under Egypt’s Constitution and international law. The court ruled for the couple, citing existing precedents and Islamic jurisprudence that allow for the right of non-Muslims to live in Muslim lands “without any of them being forced to change what they believe in” and ordered the civil registry to issue new documents that properly identify them as Bahá’ís.

The court wrote:

In the aftermath of the court ruling, various news media in Egypt and the Arab world reported on the ruling. Human rights groups in Egypt were supportive of the decision, while representatives of Al-Azhar University and the government were negative. Newspapers in Bahrain, Kuwait and elsewhere in the region also wrote about the case, with many going into long explanations about the Bahá’í Faith. Some statements by other organizations after the initial ruling include:

On 28 April 2006 after reading that the Egyptian government asked for information on the Bahá’í Faith from members of Al-Azhar University, and knowing that much misinformation about the Bahá’í Faith has been published in the Egyptian media, the Bahá’í International Community’s United Nations Office wrote to leaders of the Al Azhar Islamic Research Council to explain the essential principles of Bahá’í belief. The letter, which contained a brief statement of basic Bahá’í principles and doctrine, also asked that facts about the Bahá’í religion be obtained from trustworthy sources that were “uninfluenced by the misconceptions” that are being spread about the Bahá’í Faith.

The Egyptian government formally appealed the Administrative Court’s ruling on 7 May 2006. The appeal came after attacks on the ruling in the Egyptian parliament and by representatives of Al-Azhar Islamic Centre. According to the IRIN news service water in a glass bottle, an Interior Ministry official, speaking on the condition of anonymity, said: “We presented an appeal to revoke the previous ruling on the basis that neither the Egyptian constitution nor Islamic law recognize Bahaism [sic] as a religion unto itself.” Then on 13 May 2006 Kifayah, a loosely organized group of civil society organizations, journalists, writers, artists and academics, issued a collective statement calling for an end to discrimination against Bahá’ís. The group which is composed of the Popular Group for Change, the Egyptian Democratic Centre, the Centre for Socialist Studies, Socialist Horizons, the Arabic network for Human Rights Information, and Civil Watch for Human Rights, along with some 40 journalists, writers remington shavers canada, artists and academics wrote:

Egypt’s Supreme Administrative Court on 15 May suspended the implementation of the earlier lower Administrative Court ruling that allowed Bahá’ís to have their religion recognized on official documents. The court agreed to hear the appeal starting on June 16, which continued to September 16. During this time, the state-sponsored National Council for Human Rights held a major symposium on the issues surrounding religious affiliation and identity cards, at which the Bahá’í community offered some testimony. The hearing was, however, postponed by the Supreme Administrative Court on 21 September 2006 until 20 November, to await the completion of an advisory report by the State Commissioner’s Authority.

During the court’s wait, the Egyptian newspaper Rose al-Youssef published a story on October 14, 2006 stating that the advisory report was completed, and that the State Commissioner’s Authority is urging the rejection of the lower court’s ruling. Then on 2 December a final hearing was held; the court indicated that its judgement would be issued in the case on 16 December. The Supreme Administrative Court issued its final judgement in the case of Husam Izzat Musa and Ranya Enayat Rushdy on 16 December, upholding the government’s policy of allowing only three religious affiliations on state ID cards and government documents.

After the ruling, various Egyptian human rights organizations, such as the Cairo Centre for Human Rights Studies, issued statements of support for the Bahá’í community of Egypt in their struggle for basic civil rights. The Universal House of Justice, the highest governing body of the Baha’i Faith on 21 December addressed a message to the Baha’is of Egypt in the wake of the Supreme Administrative Court’s decision stating that they should continue in striving to continue to uphold the principle of the oneness of humankind and other Bahá’í principles.

On January 29, 2008 Cairo’s court of Administrative Justice, ruling on two related court cases, and after six postponements, ruled in favour of the Bahá’ís, allowing them to obtain birth certificates and identification documents, so long as they omit their religion on court documents; the government may, however, still appeal against the judgement. The director of the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, who has brought the two cases to court, stated “This is a very welcome decision. It addresses a great injustice suffered by Bahai citizens who face arbitrary and discriminatory practices based on their religious beliefs. We urge that the authorities implement the Administrative Court’s decision.” The chief judge in the court case stated that while the Baha’i Faith is still not recognized as one of the three officially recognized state religions, they will enjoy the right to refuse to identify oneself as one of those three religions, and will have access to state cards. Egyptian Ministry of Interior was slow to implement the ruling: as of April 22, 2008, no identification cards had been issued to Bahá’ís.

Since the December 16, 2006 decision by Egypt’s Supreme Administrative Court, two other court cases addressing the rights of Egyptian Bahá’ís to obtain basic identity documents and education have been brought up. The first case, which was filed on February 2007, was brought forward by the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR) on behalf of a Bahá’í university student, Hosni Hussein Abdel-Massih. Abdel-Massih was suspended from the Suez Canal University’s Higher Institute of Social Work since he was unable to obtain an identity card due to his religious affiliation. The Court of Administrative Justice in Cairo was to decide on this case on September 5, 2007 but postponed the decision to October 30, 2007. The case was further postponed, for the fifth time on January 22, 2008, for an anticipated verdict during the 29 January 2008 court session. On January 29, 2008, Cairo’s court of Administrative Justice ruled in favour of the Bahá’ís, allowing them to obtain identification documents, so long as they omit their religion on court documents.

The second case involved two 14-year-old twins who were unable to obtain birth certificates unless they converted to a recognized religion reusable bpa free water bottles. While the father of the twins had originally obtained birth certificates when the children were born in 1993 with their religious affiliation as Bahá’í, he was unable to obtain new birth certificates which contain the national number. Without the national number on the birth certificate, the children were unable to enroll in public schools. Since the Supreme Administrative Court’s decision in 2006 found that the government had the right to deny Egyptian Bahá’ís identity documents recognizing their religious affiliation, the EIPR modified the requested remedies in the case; the issue before the Court of Administrative Justice is whether Bahá’ís can obtain documents without any religious affiliation or without falsely identifying oneself as one of the recognized religions. This court case was also set to be decided up on September 5, 2007, but the decision has also been postponed to October 30, 2007. As with the other court case, Cairo’s court of Administrative Justice also ruled in favour of the Bahá’ís, allowing them to obtain birth certificates, if they omit their religion on the documents. The EIPR stated that they will immediately seek to obtain papers for the twins.

To comply with the January 2008 ruling, on April 14, 2009, the interior minister of Egypt released a decree amending the law to allow Egyptians who are not Muslim, Christian, or Jewish to obtain identification documents that list dash in place of one of the three recognized religion. The first identification cards were issued to two Bahá’ís (the two twins who have turned 16 by then) under the new decree on August 8, 2009.

The state of things after the 2011 Egyptian revolution is not clear. There have been renewed threats from some quarters of Egyptian society. In late 2012 Dr. Ibrahim Ghoniem, acting Minister of Education and member of the Muslim Brotherhood stated his opinion the Bahá’í children would be excluded from the Egyptian school system. Related comments also put in doubt the status of the Identification Controversy.